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This article builds on punctuated equilibrium theory to evaluate the diffusion of public policy innova-
tions in the United States. The article argues that punctuated equilibrium theory provides a unifying
framework for understating three mechanisms leading to the diffusion of innovations: gradual policy
diffusion driven by incremental policy emulation, rapid state-to-state diffusion driven by policy imi-
tation and mimicking, and nearly immediate policy diffusion driven by state-level responses to a
common exogenous shock. Drawing upon the Bass mixed influence diffusion model, this research
generates measures of the coefficients of external and internal influences for diffusion for 81 public
policy innovations that have spread across the United States. The article then evaluates how the policy
image and direct participation of the federal government contribute to distinct patterns of diffusion over
time.
Introduction
In recent years, studies of public policy diffusion have documented considerable
variation in the speed and scope of public policy adoption across states (Boushey,
2010; Makse & Volden, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009). Although most policies spread
gradually, in a manner consistent with incremental policy learning and emulation, a
significant subset of innovations trigger policy outbreaks, as states across the country
mimic a popular new initiative. In this regard, the process of policy diffusion pro-
duces patterns of policy change consistent with negative and positive feedback
cycles familiar to punctuated equilibrium theory (PET). As Baumgartner and Jones
(2009) observed, “policy diffusion, with its S-Shaped curve, is remarkably like a
punctuated equilibrium model in which the system shits rapidly from one stable
point to another” (p. 17).
Surprisingly, the triggers of these punctuated dynamics have been largely over-
looked by extant research in public policy diffusion—the formal study of how ideas
move from one jurisdiction to the next in political systems. Although researchers
have suggested that policy diffusion results from decision-making processes as
distinct as incremental policy emulation (Berry & Berry, 1999; Boehmke & Witmer,
2004; Gray, 1973; Volden, 2006; Walker, 1969), rapid policy imitation and mimicking
(Boushey, 2010; Mooney & Lee, 1999; Savage, 1985), and federal agenda setting and
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coercion (Allen, Pettus, & Haider-Markel, 2004; Karch, 2006, 2010; Welch & Thomp-
son, 1980), most of this research has focused on identifying the specific mechanism
of influence leading to innovation diffusion rather than distinguishing between the
causes of comparative diffusion dynamics. Recent research has moved toward a
more complete understanding of the factors leading to variation in the speed and
scope of diffusion; however, this research has largely focused on the differences of
innovation attributes (Makse & Volden, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009) rather than
broad interactions leading to policy outbreaks across state governments.
This article integrates research from punctuated equilibrium theory to distin-
guish between different decision-making processes leading to punctuated diffusion
dynamics. Building on recent advances in the study of agenda setting and decision
making (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Workman, Jones, &
Jochim, 2009), the article argues that variation in the speed of innovation diffusion
should be understood as resulting from the disproportionate allocation of political
attention in the United States. In the majority of cases, diffusion occurs through the
gradual formulation and adjustment of policy across state legislatures. At other
times, state policymakers are faced with growing public demands to pass an emerg-
ing “fad” policy implemented in neighboring states. Often, new policy problems
are revealed by exogenous shocks (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 1984) or
new policy solutions are demanded by the federal government (Karch, 2006). These
distinct pressures systematically lead to very different temporal patterns of
diffusion.
To capture the dynamic processes of innovation diffusion, this article estimates
Bass (1969) mixed influence diffusion parameters for each of 81 policies that have
spread across the United States. Applied to the study of public policy diffusion, the
Bass mixed influence model provides a method to distinguish between the rate of
policy adoption driven by state exposure to a common exogenous stimulus, such as a
federal mandate or amobilizing event, and the rate of contagion that measures policy
adoption associated with endogenous influence as policies spread through interstate
communication and influence. Aggregated across public policies, the Bass model
provides valuable information on the standard rate of diffusion in the United States
and also produces a more nuanced measure for capturing diffusion through incre-
mental policy emulation, sudden policy mimicking, and vertical coercion.
To illustrate how Bass diffusion parameters can be applied to model the causes
of punctuated dynamics in the diffusion of innovation, the article compares coeffi-
cients of external and internal influence in diffusion across a series of illustrative
cases, focusing on social security policy, transportation safety, child welfare, tobacco
regulation, and professional certification and licensing. These comparisons demon-
strate how direct federal involvement and public responses to policies with very
different attributes shape patterns of innovation diffusion. First, patterns of innova-
tion diffusion differ drastically depending on the participation of the federal gov-
ernment. Direct federal intervention into state public policymaking produces
R-shaped diffusion curves, consistent with exogenous influence diffusion models.
Second, variation in policy attributes also shapes the speed of diffusion. Policies
focusing on issues that possess broad appeal and low complexity diffuse more
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rapidly than more complex and costly regulatory policies, producing steep S-shaped
cumulative diffusion curves.
Policy Dynamics in Diffusion of Innovations Research
In general, policy diffusion research has mirrored the broader study of innova-
tion diffusion by focusing on how variation in the host, carriers, and agents interact
to produce patterns of policy change in the political system (Boushey, 2010). Follow-
ing Walker (1969), significant scholarly attention has focused on how variation in
state political, institutional, cultural, economic, and social characteristics shapes
receptivity to innovation over time (Berry & Berry, 1990; Boushey, 2010; Canon &
Baum, 1981; Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, & Peterson, 2004; Nice, 1994; Savage,
1978). Researchers have demonstrated how political and institutional attributes such
as state ideology (Grossback et al., 2004), legislative professionalism (Boushey, 2010;
Carter & LaPlant, 1997; Tolbert, 2002; Volden, 2006), political competition (Karch,
2006), and state public opinion (Pacheco, 2012) shape state susceptibility to innova-
tion adoption.
Other research has identified the role of carriers in the diffusion of innovations,
documenting how professional organizations (Balla, 2001; Gray, 1973; Quaile-Hill &
Hurley, 1988), interest group networks (Mintrom & Vergari, 1998), and policy entre-
preneurs (Mintrom, 1997) organize interstate efforts targeting policy change and
communicate policy lessons regarding successes and failures across jurisdictions.
Finally, a growing number of researchers have focused on the virulence of the idea
itself and have explored how policy attributes such as cost, complexity, salience, and
flexibility shape the speed and scope of innovation diffusion over time (Boushey,
2010; Makse & Volden, 2011; Mooney & Lee, 1999; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Savage,
1985).
Political scientists have also employed diffusion research to identify the mecha-
nisms of policy influence and learning in federalism. Following the study of orga-
nizational decision making advanced by Lindblom (1959), many researchers have
argued that policy diffusion results from a process of incremental learning and
policy emulation by state governments (Berry & Berry, 1990; Gray, 1973; Mooney &
Lee, 1999; Walker, 1969). By evaluating emerging innovations, state legislatures are
able to reduce both the information costs and uncertainty regarding the outcomes of
a new policy (Glick & Hays, 1991; Lindblom, 1959; Volden, 2006; Weyland, 2005).
This incremental learning model confirms the benefits of decentralized policymak-
ing as states are more likely to emulate policy successes than failures (Volden, 2006).
Although incremental policy emulation through social policy learning or eco-
nomic competition remains the dominant decision-making model in innovation and
diffusion research, scholars have identified two important alternate mechanisms of
diffusion. First, research on sudden patterns of policy adoption suggests that diffu-
sion often occurs more rapidly than models of policy evaluation and emulation
anticipate (Boushey, 2010; Lee &Mooney, 1999; Savage, 1985). In such cases, diffusion
represents a process of rapid imitation, mimicking, or isomorphic policy learning
(Foucault & Montpetit, 2011) as demands for sudden policy adoption compel deci-
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sion makers to replicate the experiments of their peers based on expected future
benefits, a process May (1992) referred to as superstitious policy learning.
Other researchers have highlighted the disproportionate influence of the federal
government in the vertical diffusion of innovations as state policy adoption occurs in
response to the influence of the national government’s agenda-setting activities.
Research has identified the influence of federal mandates and grants (Allen et al.,
2004; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Welch & Thompson, 1980), as well as more general
congressional and presidential agenda setting (Karch, 2010; McCann, Shipan, &
Volden, 2010), on state-level innovation adoption. The key distinction for these
national interaction models is that diffusion occurs through vertical influence as
policy-relevant information is simultaneously transferred to the many states from the
federal government.1
Punctuated Equilibrium and the Diffusion of Innovations
Boushey (2010) argued that these distinct models of decision making could be
integrated in a single framework. Following Baumgartner and Jones (2009), Boushey
(2010) theorized that the variation in the speed and scope of diffusion resulted from
the disproportionate allocation of political attention in federalism. Punctuated dif-
fusion dynamics emerge as the policy image, receptive venues, and interest group
carriers of innovation interact to produce policy change over time.
A first major implication of punctuated equilibrium theory is that political
responses to innovations changewith the way a problem is defined by politicians and
publics. Studies in agenda setting have revealed how problem definition and issue
framing alter political responses to policy problems. Shifting arguments surround-
ing policy reform can invite renewed interest in a policy problem, expanding the
scope of conflict to new actors and eventually leading to policy change (Baumgartner
& Jones, 2009; Schattschneider, 1975). For example, the movement to regulate
nuclear energy in the 1970s gained political traction when nuclear power was rede-
fined as a potential public health and environmental threat rather than as a cheap
and renewable source of energy (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).
Studies of policy change in American politics have documented how broad
changes in the policy environment can lead to changes in the policy image (Baum-
gartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 1984). Sudden policy change can be triggered by a
focusing event as an exogenous shock to the political system directs system-wide
political attention on a new dimension of a policy problem as occurred following the
Three Mile Island nuclear reactor meltdown.
Although focusing events present one source of exogenous pressure leading to
policy change, such shocks are not the only mechanism leading to shifts in public
policy images over time. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) observed that changes
in policy indicators, as well as temporal changes in the tone of media coverage,
can redirect public and political perceptions of policy problems. For example,
support for tobacco regulation increased gradually as consensus emerged in the
scientific community regarding the health dangers cigarettes pose to smokers and
nonsmokers.
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The distinct pressures leading to shifts in political attention to specific policy
problems contribute to different patterns of diffusion. Focusing events may trigger
extremely rapid positive feedback cycles of policy diffusion, especially when
national media coverage simultaneously focuses policymaking attention to specific
policy problems across state governments. Boushey (2010) observed that when
awareness of the innovation simultaneously reveals both the policy problem and the
policy solution, a large number of states will simultaneously adopt the same policy
innovation as decision making occurs through policy imitation rather than incremen-
tal policy emulation. However, when the image of policy reverses through a shift in
policy indicators, public policy diffusion may proceed more gradually as innovation
adoption is determined by shifts in local attention to an emerging problem.
Beyond the macro-political factors leading to shifts in political attention, studies
of policy diffusion have further explored how the image of a particular policy
innovation shapes diffusion patterns. Savage (1985) argued that rate of policy diffu-
sion is in no small part shaped by the degree of organized opposition or “fragility”
for policies targeting a particular social group. Some policy targets spur rapid pol-
itical action whereas others demand less urgent responses. Child welfare
policies—characterized by generally high salience, low complexity, and strong elec-
toral support—should encourage atypically rapid patterns of diffusion (Boushey,
2010).
Other policy targets will engender less mass political involvement, resisting
pressure for rapid policy change. Efforts to regulate professional groups through
licensing requirements should engender considerable opposition from the targeted
group but are not likely to invoke large public response. Similarly, interest group
pressure may prevent rapid diffusion when a new policy reform is met with strong
opposition from the entrenched policy monopoly as with efforts to enact smoking
regulation (Givel, 2006).
A second key implication of punctuated equilibrium theory is that the institu-
tional context of policymaking in the United States amplifies punctuated dynamics in
the diffusion of innovations. Institutions impose decision costs that precipitate stick
slip dynamics in public policymaking as pressures for policy change push against
institutional rules that impose friction or gridlock on the policy process (Baumgart-
ner et al., 2009). In this regard, the multiple veto points of policymaking in the
United States should slow the process of policy diffusion as innovation adoption
requires independent legislative decisions across state governments. For policy dif-
fusion to occur at all requires significant system-wide political attention to overcome
the barriers to policy change.
Although federalism makes policy coordination difficult, it also creates oppor-
tunities for considerable policy innovation, as municipal, county, and state govern-
ments develop new policies to address local concerns. Federalism encourages venue
shopping, a process where activists and interest groups strategically exploit the
multiple venues of government to secure support for their legislative programs
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Holyoke, 2003; Pralle, 2003). This process increases the
number of new ideas entering the political systems and can create conditions where
“new ideas or policy images may spread rapidly across linked venues, thus setting
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in motion a positive feedback process” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 240). This is
especially likely when a focusing event directs national political attention on a local
policy reform that appeals broadly to voters. Federalism therefore creates both
opportunities and constraints for rapid policy diffusion.
Baumgartner and Jones (2009) observed two different ways that issue expansion
can lead to sudden patterns of policy diffusion. First, issue attention can lead to the
nationalization of policy attention as federal institutions focus policymaking atten-
tion on a policy program that had previously been viewed as a concern of local and
state governments. When this occurs, the federal government emerges as a strong
catalyst for state-level policy adoption, employing grants, mandates, or other signals
to simultaneously change policy across the states. In the 1960s, growing concern over
highway conditions led to direct federal intervention in state transportation laws,
most prominently linking federal highway funding to state adoption of mandatory
motorcycle helmet legislation. Furthermore, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) sug-
gested that the nationalization of issue attention on transportation safety legitimized
sustained federal involvement in this issue area, resulting in a sustained period of
rapid policy change.
Positive feedback cycles can also be triggered absent the direct involvement of
the federal government. Boushey (2010) noted that issue attention can also be nation-
alized through sustained interest group campaigns as prominent advocacy groups
organize to implement a policy from one state to the next. For example, state-level
adoption of child abuse reporting statutes occurred not through top-down coercion
but through the rapid communication of a model state law across a professional
interest group network of advocacy organization (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).
Modeling the Dynamics of Diffusion
The competing pressures of exogenous and endogenous influence leading to
policy change are well-documented in other diffusion study analogs. For example,
epidemiologists have distinguished between “point source” outbreaks, which occur
when a subpopulation simultaneously becomes ill after exposure to a common
contaminant, and propagated person-to-person outbreaks, which emerge when a
contagious disease is communicated via person-to-person interactions (Boushey,
2010; Rossman, 2012). In the social sciences, scholars in fields as diverse as commu-
nications, sociology, and marketing have distinguished between internal and exter-
nal dynamics in diffusion, focusing on howmass media effects or advertising shapes
the awareness of a new product or event and the extent to which consumer behavior
is driven by person-to-person interactions (Bass, 1969; Rossman, Chiu, & Mol, 2008;
Valente, 1993).
These distinct diffusion processes are illustrated in three general models of
diffusion. Internal diffusion models have been employed to model endogenous influ-
ence in social systems. Exogenous or external diffusion models have identified how
common exogenous pressures shape adopting behavior in a social system. Inte-
grated together, the mixed influence diffusion model captures both processes, allowing
researchers to model the joint influence of exogenous and endogenous pressures on
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adoption across units in a social system. These diffusion models provide basic
insights into the shape of the distribution of policy adoptions over time and provide
amethod for identifying innovation driven by incremental policy emulation, positive
feedback cycles, and federal coercion.
Internal Diffusion Models
The internal influence diffusion model has been employed to model the conta-
gion of a new product or innovation as it is passed from one actor to the next through
interunit contact or communication. In the internal diffusion model, the mechanisms
of diffusion are endogenous to the social system as diffusion results from progres-
sive contact between units in the social system over time. This process produces what
Rogers (2003) described as the diffusion curve, an S-shaped cumulative distribution
curve that unfolds as an innovation spreads from a single pioneer to other actors in
a social system.
Mathematically, the internal process is described by the internal influence diffu-
sion model, given by Mahajan and Peterson (1985) as
dN t
dt
bN t N N t
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is the rate of diffusion at time t, N(t) is the cumulative number of
adopters at time t, N is the total number of potential adopters at time t, and b is the
constant of imitation or internal influence.
The cumulative adopters’ distribution function of the internal diffusion model
produces an S-shaped logistic diffusion curve, and can be represented by the fol-













Because the internal diffusion model provides an estimate of the constant of
internal influence, the model is applied to assess the comparative contagion of
distinct innovations. The constant b returns a measure of emulation, imitation, or
contagion (Mahajan & Peterson, 1985). A low constant b suggests innovation diffu-
sion occurs gradually over time, while a higher value indicates more rapid unit-to-
unit diffusion as with imitation caused by positive feedback cycles, fads,
bandwagons, or information cascades (Rossman et al., 2008). Figure 1 illustrates this
dynamic with three distinct S-shaped curves representing different rates of diffusion
through internal influence. The forms of these curves differ in scope and asymptote,
demonstrating how changing constants of contagion can lead to differences in the
rate of diffusion through a social system.2
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External Influence Models
Diffusion through internal influence describes only one way that actors in a
social system encounter innovation. In the pure external influence model of diffusion,
awareness and learning about innovation occurs from pressures outside of the social
system, leading a significant subset to react rapidly to an exogenous stimulus. For
example, in epidemiology, sudden population exposure to environmental toxins can
result in immediate and widespread illness in a very short time frame, as with the
tragic Union Carbide pesticide gas leak in Bhopal, India. Plotted over time, the
common source external diffusion models produce an R-shaped distribution, as
the uptake of innovation may occur nearly simultaneously.
Mathematical modelers of innovation diffusion describe this process with the
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Figure 1. S-Shaped Adoption Curves.
This graph illustrates how variation in the coefficient of internal influence b shapes patterns of diffusion
over time. Higher values of the coefficient of internal influence produce steeper diffusion curves. Lower
values of the coefficient of internal influence produce flatter diffusion curves.




describes the rate of innovation adoption, N(t) is the cumulative
number of adopters at time t, and a is a coefficient or constant of external influence
describing the influence of all factors other than interpersonal communication.
The cumulative density function is given by Mahajan and Peterson (1985) as
N t N at( ) = − −( )[ ]1 exp (4)
Studies of innovation diffusion have employed the external diffusion model
constant a to represent the influence of exogenous forces on the adoption of inno-
vations over time. High values of a produce sharp R-shaped distributions, indicating
a strong influence of the exogenous influence. Conversely, diffusion processes with
lower values produce more gradual exponential curves.
The Mixed Influence Diffusion Model
The internal and external diffusion models are useful for representing theoreti-
cal diffusion processes driven by pure internal or external influence; however, both
theory and observational data suggest that in most examples, social systems are
jointly influenced by endogenous and exogenous forces. For example, in manufac-
turing, producers may wish to predict how media or advertising campaigns and
word of mouth each shape the diffusion of a new product. Following the work of
Bass (1969), themixed influence diffusion model has been applied to estimate external
and internal influences in the diffusion of innovations (Bass, 1969; Mahajan & Peter-
son, 1985; Rossman, 2009; Srinivasan & Mason, 1986; Valente, 1993). The Bass model
returns constants of external and internal influence, allowing researchers to identify
exogenous and endogenous factors contributing to the diffusion of innovations.
To model these joint processes, the mixed influence diffusion model subsumes
both internal and external diffusion models into a single model, given here by
Mahajan and Peterson (1985) as
dN t
dt
a bN t N N t
( )
= + ( )( ) − ( )[ ] (5)






















exp − +( ) −( )[ ]a bN t t0
(6)
where a represents the constant of external influence, b represents the coefficient of
internal influence, andNrepresents the total number of units adopting the innovation.
It is important to note that the mixed influence model retains features of the
internal and external diffusion models. When the constant a reduces to zero, the Bass
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mixed influence model represents a logistic diffusion function and essentially
becomes an internal influence or contagion model (Chandrasekaran & Tellis, 2008).
When constant b equals zero, the model reduces to an exponential function repre-
senting pure exogenous influence on the diffusion of innovations. Positive values for
both parameters represent the joint influence that exogenous and endogenous con-
tagions have on diffusion of innovation.
Figure 2 illustrates three different rates of innovation diffusion curves resulting
from the Bass mixed influence diffusion model. Innovations with high coefficients a
will return diffusion curves similar to the external influence model. Innovations with
high coefficients b will return more gradual S-shaped curves characteristic of the
internal diffusion model. Innovations with joint influence fall in between these two
theoretical curves depending on the size of the constants of external and internal
influence.
Mixed Influence Models and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
The mixed influence diffusion model provides a powerful tool for modeling the
dynamic processes of innovation diffusion driven by incremental policy emulation
and sudden positive feedback cycles resulting from either federal coercion or sudden
Figure 2. Theoretical Diffusion Curves.
This graph illustrates how variation in the coefficients of external and internal influence shapes patterns of
diffusion over time. Higher values of the coefficient of internal influence produce steeper diffusion curves.
Lower values of the coefficient of internal influence produce flatter diffusion curves.
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policy mimicking.3 The coefficient of external influence a captures the extent to
which a subset of state governments are responding to exogenous agenda setting
pressures, such as those resulting from a focusing event or federal mandates. The
mixed model’s internal influence constant b provides the contagion parameter,
allowing researchers to distinguish between rapid policy diffusion characteristic of
positive feedback cycles, policy outbreaks, and fads, and more gradual policy diffu-
sion consistent with incremental emulation. A higher value of the constant b indi-
cates a faster rate of diffusion, implying policy diffusion through positive feedback
cycles rather than gradual incremental emulation.4
Data and Method
The cases selected for analysis parallel those examined inAgendas and Instability in
American Politics (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). This approach allows us to understand
howprocesses leading to national level policy change also shaped individual patterns
of diffusion. The research relies on these cases to illustrate how federal mandates,
mobilizing events, changes in policy indicators, shifts in policy targets, and differ-
ences in issue complexity have historically triggered different patterns of diffusion.
To evaluate patterns of policy diffusion in the United States, this investigation
gathered information on state years of adoptions for 81 different innovations. Fol-
lowingWalker’s definition of innovation as “a program or policy which is new to the
state adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states
have adopted it” (1969, p. 881), the study only included innovations that were
formally enacted into law by state governmental institutions. Furthermore, following
prior research that restricted innovations by the scope of diffusion, this research
instead restricted the sample to innovations adopted by at least 10 states prior to
20095 (Canon & Baum, 1981; Savage, 1978; Walker, 1969).
Because of the considerable difficulties identifying the universe of policy inno-
vations, this research followed a convenience sampling strategy, drawing heavily
from prior published research in public policy diffusion. The data set includes
policies drawn from Walker’s (1969), Boushey’s (2010), and Makse and Volden’s
(2011) large data sets, as well as a number of individual cases identified through key
word searches in JSTOR and ExpandedAcademic Index. These data span issue areas
representing welfare, health and public safety, crime and corrections, taxes, licensing
and professional regulation, education, elections, sexuality, state economic develop-
ment, and environmental policy. However, policies are not evenly distributed across
issue areas as the data set includes a significant oversample of contemporary crimi-
nal justice policies.6 A full list of these policies, as well as supplementary files for
replication, are available from the author.7
Policies were coded along two dimensions. First, innovations were sorted by
issue area, specifically identifying child welfare, transportation safety, smoking regu-
lation, criminal justice, and professional licensing policies. Issues were classified as
child welfare policy when the innovation directly addressed the welfare or well-
being of children.8 Transportation safety measures included policies protecting
drivers, passengers, and bike riders.9 Licensing policies represent public policies that
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specifically grant entry to and maintain professional standards for the conduct and
practice of specialized labor in the states. Finally, tobacco regulation policies included
all efforts to regulate consumption of and access to tobacco. All remaining policies
that did not fall into these categories were coded into a common reference group.
Researchers also coded policies by federal intervention, identifying whether
each innovation had been the focus of a major federal mandate or grant-in-aid
program. Because of the difficult challenges of matching 81 policies spanning a
century to information on supplementary federal grant programs and policy recom-
mendations, this research adopted an extremely conservative coding scheme that
counted only programs initiated through major federal grants and/or mandates.10
To construct the dependent variables for analysis, this study employed nonlinear
least squares regression (NLS) to estimate Bass mixed influence diffusion parameters
of internal and external influence for each policy innovation (Srinivasan & Mason,
1986).11 NLS methods have been shown to produce less biased estimates of the Bass
diffusion parameters than prior methods using ordinary least squares (OLS) or
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (Srinivasan & Mason, 1986). The approach
provides estimates and standard errors for the coefficients a, b, and N for each policy
innovation under analysis.12 Replication code and a procedure for producing Bass
estimates on a sample data set are available from the author (see note 7). Finally, this
study employed analysis variance and comparison of means tests to evaluate mean
differences in the rates of diffusion across these issue areas.
Results
This research first calculated the mean values for the coefficients of external and
internal influence in public policy diffusion across the full sample of 81 innovations.13
Larger values of the coefficient of external influence (a > 0.10) are associated with
sharp exponential diffusion curves, indicating a strong influence of external factors
on the diffusion of policy innovations. Smaller values of the constant b are associated
with gradual S-shaped cumulative diffusion curves over time, while higher values
produce steep S-shaped curves. Table 1 presents mean values for the overall sample,
as well as Bass diffusion estimates for four illustrative cases—the diffusion of man-
datory motorcycle helmet legislation, theAmberAlert, charter school legislation, and
restaurant smoking bans.
As predicted by the general punctuation hypothesis, Table 1 documents consid-
erable variation in rates of diffusion in the overall sample, suggesting that the friction
imposed by the institution of federalism generally leads to disjointed patterns of
diffusion. The average value for the coefficient of external influence a is 0.02 (min = 0,
max = 0.31, standard deviation [SD] = 0.05.) The mean value for the coefficient of
internal influence b is 1.03 (min = 0.03, maximum = 4.75, SD = 1.07). This research
therefore identifies considerable variation in the rates of exogenous and internal
diffusion consistent with broader research on distributions of policy change in PET.
To illustrate how Bass diffusion can be used to distinguish between diffusion
triggered by incremental policy emulation, positive feedback cycles, and federal
intervention, Table 1 highlights Bass diffusion coefficients for a subset of
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representative cases. As expected, motorcycle helmet legislation is characterized by
an extremely high coefficient of external influence and an average constant of inter-
nal influence (a = 0.31, b = 0.957), while the Amber Alert is marked by a very small
value of external influence and a high coefficient of internal influence (a = 0,
b = 3.02.) Restaurants smoking bans have lower than average coefficients of internal
and external diffusion, indicative of policy incrementalism (a = 0.01, b = 0.19).14
Finally, the diffusion of state charter school legislation provides a reference illus-
trating the average values for both external (a = 0.02) and internal influence
(b = 0.63) in diffusion.
Figure 3 plots the empirical and predicted Bass distinct diffusion curves for
these four representative innovations. Here, the diffusion of motorcycle helmet leg-
islation shows the steep R-shaped curve indicative of exogenous influence diffusion
common in federal interaction models. The Amber Alert has a steep S-shaped dif-
fusion curve indicative of a positive feedback cycle. State adoption of charter schools
legislation follows the classic S-shaped diffusion curve most closely, representative
of a process of incremental policy emulation. Restaurant smoking adoptions produce
a more extreme diffusion curve of incremental policy emulation as the innovation
spreadmore slowly in response to evolving preferences for tobacco legislation across
the 50 states.
These graphs stand as a reference for understanding how variation in Bass
diffusion parameters related to patterns of diffusion over time. High values for the
constant of external influence a produce R-shaped exponential diffusion curves as
with the mandatory motorcycle helmet legislation. High values for the constant b
produce steep S-shaped distributions similar to the Amber Alert. Lower values for
both parameters produce more gradual S-shaped distributions, indicating gradual
policy diffusion, as with charter schools or indoor smoking regulation.
Table 2 produces average values for internal and external influence in diffusion
across transportation safety policy, child welfare policy, professional licensing policy,
and smoking regulation. Table 2 also considers the rates of diffusion for a small
group of policies initiated by the federal government through major grants or





















Standard errors in italics
*p < 0.05.
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mandates. These comparisons across samples provide for a preliminary test of the
hypothesis that punctuated dynamics are in part shaped by systematic pressures
related to both external and internal diffusion models.
Perhaps the more interesting findings emerge in the comparison of the triggers
of punctuated diffusion dynamics in the United States. The three policies that spread
through direct federal intervention (mandatory motorcycle helmet legislation, aid
for families with dependent children, and aid to the disabled) produced average
external influence diffusion parameters of b = 0.24, a statistically significant differ-
ence from the overall population average of 0.02 (c2 = 8.5, p < 0.05). Although the
small sample and limitations in classifying federal intervention mean this result
should be read with caution, the finding nonetheless lends preliminary support the
general claim that the nationalization of issue attention leading to direct federal
Figure 3. Empirical and Bass Diffusion Curves for Distinct Cases of Innovation Diffusion.
The dashed and dotted line represents the empirical cumulative number of adoptions over time. The solid
line represents the Bass diffusion estimates for the cumulative number of adoptions over time.
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intervention can fundamentally change the process of innovation diffusion. When
policy attention is nationalized and the federal government intervenes strongly in
state affairs, rapid diffusion will resemble an external influence diffusion process.
Table 2 also provides an initial test of the factors contributing to variation in the
coefficient of internal influence across issue areas. Following prior research in policy
diffusion and punctuated dynamics in policymaking, this research anticipated that
smoking regulation and professional licensing policy would both produce gradual
diffusion curves while both child protection and transportation safety policy would
be more likely to trigger positive feedback cycles.
The three tobacco regulatory policies in the sample (regulating smoking in
restaurants, government buildings, and the sale of out-of-package cigarettes) have
an average rate of 0.35 for the constant of internal influence. This falls well below
the mean value of diffusion, suggesting tobacco policy may be slowed by the par-
ticipation of organized interests, coupled with cautious state emulation of regula-
tory policies. The research also confirms the low coefficient of imitation for
professional licensing policies (b = 0.27), confirming a finding of Boushey (2010)
that professional regulatory policy would be characterized by incremental decision
making.
A different dynamic emerges in the rapid diffusion of child welfare policies.
These policies have average coefficients of external influence (a = 0.03), but higher
than average values of internal influence (b = 1.30), suggesting these child welfare
standard policy innovations spread more rapidly than standard policy innovations.
Transportation safety policy is also characterized by high values of both external and
internal influence (a = 0.09, b = 1.26), although the value of the external influence
coefficient reduces to the mean value of 0.02 when motorcycle helmet policy is
excluded. This provides very preliminary support that diffusion occurs more rapidly
following the nationalization of issue attention within a policy area.
Although the Kruskal–Wallis rank sum test confirms no statistically significant
difference between the values of external or internal influence across these policy
types, there is some support that the speed of internal diffusion is shaped by






All policies 81 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.31
Federal mandates 3 0.24 0.07 0.19 0.31
Transportation safety 4 0.09 0.15 0.01 0.31
Child welfare 8 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.21
Professional licensing 5 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
Smoking regulation 3 0.007 0.007 0.00 0.014
All policies 81 1.03 1.07 0.03 4.75
Federal mandates 3 1.42 0.44 0.96 1.82
Transportation safety 4 1.26 0.43 0.84 1.72
Child welfare 8 1.28s 0.99 0.27 3.01
Professional licensing 5 0.27 0.05 0.20 0.32
Smoking regulation 3 0.345 0.188 0.192 0.54
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the policy characteristic. The comparison of these subgroup means is suggestive,
given the limited sample of policies falling within these four groups (c2 = 6.38,
p < 0.10).
Conclusion
The findings presented in this article align policy diffusion with recent research
in political decision making and punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner &
Jones, 2009; Boushey, 2010; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). The considerable variation in
the speed and scope of diffusion can be explained by the disproportionate allocation
of political attention across policymaking institutions in federalism. As a general
rule, policymakers are constrained by a scarcity of time, resources, and political
attention. When policy attention to a specific issue area is limited, patterns of in-
cremental policy emulation unfold gradually as decision makers update policy
with “successive limited comparison” of regional alternatives (Lindblom, 1959).
However, when policymaking attention is focused squarely on a specific issue area,
policy change across the 50 states can occur rapidly as political institutions rush to
respond to a new component of a policy threat.
This interaction of policy image and institutional venue is central for under-
standing policy diffusion dynamics. When issues traditionally left to the state and
local governments are nationalized, policy diffusion can occur extremely rapidly as
the federal government mandates innovation adoption across the country. When a
focusing event captures state-level attention, diffusion may trigger a policy band-
wagon as states rapidly imitate the innovations of their peers. This research suggests
that historically, certain issues are more likely to precipitate sudden patterns of policy
change. For example, child welfare policy (a policy area with high salience and broad
public support) will generally diffuse more rapidly than professional licensing
policy, which engenders little public attention.
The Bass diffusion model provides empirical leverage for distinguishing
between the distinct pressures that lead to policy diffusion in the United States. The
Bass model provides estimates for both internal and external diffusion, allowing
researchers to distinguish between incremental policy emulation, sudden policy
feedback cycles, and sudden policy change in response to exogenous shocks. In this
regard, Bass diffusion model improves upon prior research in policy diffusion that
employed simple dichotomous measures of rate to distinguish between rapid and
slow diffusion (Nicholson-Crotty, 2009). This is an important distinction as sudden
policy change resulting from policy mimicking and state responses to federal coer-
cion result from distinct decision-making processes. Across issue areas, the Bass
model provides a simple method for interpreting these pressures leading to variation
in the rate of diffusion.
Future research should employ Bass diffusion estimates to expand on the role of
policy indicators and mobilizing events in policy diffusion. The study of policy
diffusion has too often ignored the process of problem definition leading to policy
change, choosing instead to identify how the attributes of states or the complexity of
the innovation relate to patterns of diffusion. Our understanding of the policy
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process leading to the diffusion of innovations will be richer if research more clearly
identifies how changes in policy images precipitate the diffusion of innovations.
Graeme Boushey is a Robert Wood Johnson Scholar in Health Policy Research at the
University of Michigan and an assistant professor at the University of California,
Irvine.
Notes
The author wishes to thank Bryan Jones, Gabriel Rossman, Christophe Van den Bulte, David Klein Jones,
Jared Green, and the editors of Policy Studies Journal Peter deLeon and Chris Weible for their valuable
feedback and comments on this research. Any errors and omissions that remain are entirely my own.
1. Vertical diffusionmodels have also documented the process of bottom-up diffusion, as local initiatives
influence the policy choices of state and national governments over time (see Shipan & Volden, 2006).
2. Virginia Gray (1973) employed a form of this internal diffusionmodel to evaluate cumulative adoption
curves in her classic article “Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study.”
3. Surprisingly, although characteristics of U.S. policy diffusion data make it especially suitable for Bass
analysis (Mahajan & Peterson, 1985), themixed-influence diffusionmodel has been largely overlooked
in political science (exception: Mahajan, Haynes, & Kumar, 1977).
4. In addition to providing a technique for differentiating between endogenous and exogenous policy
punctuations in innovation diffusion, the mixed influence provides a second important corollary to
methods familiar to students of PET. The mixed influence diffusion model provides estimates based
on the analysis of the distribution of policy adoptions over time. The Bass model estimates the degree
to which innovation diffusion represents a pure logistic distribution, an exponential distribution, or a
mixture of the two. The Bass model therefore provides an appropriate method for assessing policy
punctuations and positive feedback cycles in diffusion data as the underlying processes are virtually
identical to the dynamics identified in the empirical models advanced in PET theory.
5. Prior research set a higher threshold for identifying cases of diffusion, generally including only
policies that had been adopted by at least 20 states over the time period.
6. This oversample results from the disproportionate number of crime policies collected fromMakse and
Volden’s (2011) and Boushey’s (2010) data sets. A comparison of means tests across rates of diffusion
for criminal justice and other policies suggests little difference between the measures of diffusion.
7. Data and replication files can be accessed at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/gboushey.
8. Innovations that indirectly address child welfare (such as teacher certification policies or charter
schools enabling legislation) were not included in this category.
9. Both bike helmet and child seat belt legislation could be considered both child welfare and transpor-
tation safety policy. In this case, these policies were counted as transportation safety policies. Classify-
ing these policies as child welfare innovations did little to alter the substantive findings in this article.
10. This conservative classification scheme almost certainly underestimates the role of the federal gov-
ernment in promoting policy diffusion. Future research should measure how differences in the
instruments employed by the federal government (mandates, categorical grants in aid, competitive
grants, or policy recommendations) shape patterns of diffusion.
11. Nonlinear least squares regression (NLS) models are extremely sensitive to start values for N, a, and
b. To identify plausible start values, this research used an Excel Bass diffusion template that estimates
diffusion parameters based on the cumulative number of policy adoptions over time. This approach
provided for a reliability check on the final estimates. The values reported in the article were estimated
based on the total number of adoptions per time period, which produces more reliable estimates of the
Bass parameters.
12. NLS produces Bass diffusion coefficients through curve fitting. However, this procedure is extremely
sensitive to start values. For a large subset of policies excluded from this analysis, this method could
not produce diffusion parameters. An analysis of these cases suggests that the model failed to produce
estimates when there was a considerable lag between periods of adoption. As a result, this method
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understates the disjointed and episodic nature of diffusion, as only policies with relatively short
intervals between state policy adoptions were included.
13. The estimates for a and b produced by the Bass model are not directly comparable with each other.
Values for the coefficient of external influence a can range between 0 and 1, while values for internal
influence b can take a broader range of policy values.
14. Students of punctuated equilibrium theory may also be interested to note that the W statistic indicates
that rapid diffusion processes deviate from the normal distribution, providing another check of
incrementalism in diffusion.
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